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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2737
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0391
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2224

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000238

SENSITIVE
NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019
TAGS: [NATO](#) [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [MARR](#) [AF](#) [NL](#)
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DUTCH SUPPORTIVE OF MOST
U.S. REQUESTS

REF: A. SECSTATE 31102
[1](#)B. THE HAGUE 105
[1](#)C. THE HAGUE 92

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael F. Gallagher reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

[1](#)1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. SEE PARAGRAPH 6.

[1](#)2. (S/NF) Summary: The Dutch strongly appreciated U.S.
support for the March 31 Afghanistan conference in The Hague.
The Dutch can probably support most of the requests
("Afghanistan Asks") in ref tel A, but the list should be
presented as illustrative of what the GONL might undertake at
the right time in the Government of the Netherlands decision
process on post 2010 Afghanistan commitments. See para 6 for
specific requests. End Summary.

[1](#)3. (S/NF) Momentum from the Afghanistan Conference: Charge
and polmiloff met with Deputy Director General for Political
Affairs at the Dutch MFA, Robert De Groot, on April 9. He
stated that PM Balkenende is very pleased with the success of
The Hague Conference on Afghanistan and USG praise and
appreciation of Dutch efforts in Afghanistan. De Groot
expressed appreciation for Secretary Clinton's attention to
the Dutch public during her attendance at the Afghanistan
Conference and that the public "loved it." He stated that
the Dutch can easily see the change in the approach of the
administration and welcome the willingness to consult with
their allies as well as a respect for U.S. efforts to broaden
the civilian and development efforts in Afghanistan.

[1](#)4. (S/NF) Delicate negotiations: FM Verhagen is now laying
the groundwork within the cabinet on "where he wants to be."
However, De Groot cautioned the Dai Kundi request could
jeopardize his negotiations with coalition partners. He
indicated -- without any firm commitment that the Dutch may
be prepared to meet all requests from ref A with the
exception of the new PRT in Dai Kundi, and with a reduced
amount to the Afghanistan National Army Trust Fund. However,
he suggested that if the demarche is delivered with the
inclusion of the Dai Kundi request, it could significantly
upset the balance that the FM has worked to gain consensus on
commitments to Afghanistan. This could ultimately jeopardize
the solid and significant commitments being worked by the FM.

[1](#)5. (S/NF) Furthermore, timing of the Dutch decision to
extend beyond 2010 is delicate. The Dutch Cabinet will
likely take till the end of summer before reaching a final
decision, which then must be debated in Parliament which will
take till the end of the year. Thus a specific demarche,
requesting a firm commitment now, would undermine FM's
efforts to make significant contributions. It is expected
that the best timing for the demarche will be within the next
few weeks at a time that is integrated with Cabinet
discussions.

[¶](#)6. (S/NF) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests permission from Washington to exclude the Dai Kundi request, and to present the list of actions at a date that will be supportive of the Dutch political efforts to maximize their commitments.
GALLAGHER